Image from archive
Resident Basijis of universities have increased their nightly patrol of campuses in order to identify the students writing anti-regime slogans on walls.
Basijis patrol the universities in groups of two or three from 9:00 pm to 2:00 am. They also paint over the slogans that have already been spray painted on the walls. Such attempts have been unsuccessful in breaking the will of the students since slogan writing continues.
Translation by: Tour Irani
Picture from Freedom Messenger archive
Reports received from Tehran - On Sunday January 31, 2010 at 6:30pm, people in cars from Park Vey intersection to Tajrish avenue, using the excuse of *Dahe Fajr, honked their car horns to express happiness while showing the “V” sign (V is for victory). These actions were similar to the ones on days leading to the presidential election.
The cars created [more than the usual] heavy traffic on both sides of the street, and loud music was heard playing. The number of pedestrians increased consistently.
* [translator's note] 12 Bahman marks the day Imam Khomeini returned to Iran after his exile in France. 22 Bahman is the day that the Shah’s regime was overthrown by a revolution that created the Islamic Republic. The ten days leading to the date of the Islamic Republic revolution are known as Dahe Fajr (In Farsi, “dah” is ten and “fajr is dawn).
Informes recibidos desde Teherán – El domingo 31 de enero de 2010 a las 6:30 pm, gente en carros localizados en la intersección Park Vey hasta la Avenida Tajrish, con la excusa de * Dahe Fajr, tocaron sus bocinas para expresar felicidad, mientras que mostraban el signo “V” ( V es la victoria). Estas acciones fueron similares a las de los días previos a la elección presidencial.
Los coches crearon [más de lo habitual] tráfico pesado en ambos lados de la calle, y se escuchó música en volumen alto. El número de peatones aumentó constantemente.
* [Nota del traductor] 12 Bahman es el día Imam Khomeini regresó a Irán después de su exilio en Francia. 22 Bahman es el día en que el régimen del Sha fue derrocado por la revolución que creó la República Islámica. Los diez días previos a la fecha de la Revolución de la República Islámica se conocen como Dahe Fajr (en Persa, “Dah” es diez y “Fajr” es amanecer).
Alef website report - Iran’s Ministry of Interior evaded 12 questions regarding the 2009 [Iran] presidential election
Following numerous rumors and uncertainties regarding the validity of the election during the past seven months, particularly the weeks after the election, Alef website formulated 25 key questions posed by protesters and internet viewers regarding the election results. The Ministry of Interior was asked to respond to the inquiries through one of their election officials who would act as a “special online guest”on Alef’s website.
The public relations and the Ministry of Interior officials, after three months of consecutive requests by Alef, acknowledged the 25 questions, but decided that it was not advisable for them to accept an invitation as an online guest. They stated that Alef is not allowed to publish or attribute any responses to the Ministry of Interior.
On January 4, 2010, after numerous requests by online viewers, Alef published an invitation to all its internet viewers asking them to present their questions regarding the 2009 election. Within three weeks, with support from online viewers, legal experts, and a spokesperson from the Guardian Council, the online questions were compiled.
Since the purpose of this invitation was to remove doubts and ambiguities and answer the real questions of compatriots in a fair and reasonable manner, efforts were made when selecting the questions to ensure that there would be no political or criminal considerations and to refrain from presenting questions that were not logical or reasonable or could be interpreted as slanderous or insulting. Of the 70 questions posed, 12 were directly related to the officials at the Ministry of Interior. From January 10, 2010, questions were presented to the Ministry of Interior that requested a response. However, after consecutive but unsuccessful attempts to obtain a response, Alef came to the conclusion that the Ministry of Interior had no intention of responding to the questions.
The questions are as follows:
1) Can you please explain how it is possible that in some provinces (such as Lorestan) in many of the ballot boxes (for example more than 10% of the total ballot boxes of this province) the total number of votes was a multiple of 100 (100, 200, 300 etc.)?
2) Why were some political activists (particularly the heads of Mousavi’s campaign) arrested hours and days after the election, even though the protests had only just begun?
3) In the 12 stages of vote announcements, we only heard of invalid votes pertaining to the last two stages. However, based on the films and evidence shown both on this website and others, the derived vote counts for the previous 10 stages had already been announced, and one cannot say that these vote counts were accurate. Please clarify why the invalid votes were not announced from the beginning?
4) Why was it announced that the vote counting software was written by people outside the Ministry of Interior when the Ministry of Interior had the capability of writing such software?
5) In a number of mosques that also serve as Basiji bases, people were told to vote for specific candidates, or told that certain candidates were hypocrites and against the Velayat -e Faqigh. Is this type of propaganda not against Imam Khomeini’s teachings? Did he not say to the military forces to not enter political parties? Is this not a political act?
6) The statistics published later contained many problems and uncertainties. Take the number of invalid votes in one of the ballot boxes in Lorestan as an example. How do you explain this?
7) Why did the Ministry of Interior announce on election day that it was not necessary to enter the national code for the voters in the system? Is there a possibility that birth certificates and ID stamps were erased?
8) Why won’t the Ministry of Interior publish the 40 thousand #22 forms (report on ballot vote counts) that they claim were reviewed and signed by Mousavi’s representatives? Why do they not allow it to be posted on their website in order to create more transparency for those who have contested the vote count and distinguish between those who protest the vote count and those who want to create disturbances?
9) The numbers assigned to the candidates at the voting centers were alphabetical 1) Ahmadinejad 2) Rezaee 3) Karoubi 4) Mousavi, but the codes associated with each candidate were 44: Ahmadinejad, 55: Rezaee
66:Karoubi 77: Mousavi. These codes, unlike the numbers assigned to each candidate that were logical and correct, make no logical sense. If the goal was to use two-digit numbers, then the logical and correct assignment of codes that would not lead to any mistakes or confusion would have been: 11: Ahmadinejad, 22: Rezaee, 33: Karoubi, 44: Mousavi. We await your logical response to this matter.
10) Were permits issued for the supporters of Mr. Ahmadinejad who gathered at Vali Asr Square on June 14, 2009, an event that was advertised by the government and broadcast live on television? Given that requests for permits need to be sent in one week in advance, when and by whom was this request presented to the Ministry of Interior?
11) How do you explain the letter by the governor of Firooz Abad, to the governor’s office requesting to be paid for the expenses associated with sending crowds to cheer Mr. Ahmadinejad on his trip to Shiraz in spring 2009? (Here is a link that proves that Alef posted the letter at that time. http://alef.ir/1388/content/view/49268/) What has been the response of the governor’s office and the Ministry of Interior to this letter? With 20 days left to the election, were the expenses associated with the greeters for a future presidential candidate paid by the treasury? My thanks to Alef website for publishing my question and for seeking to find answers, proving that these questions are real and not just for show.
12) Why were Mr. Rezaee’s votes reduced from 630 thousand in the morning to 580 thousand in the afternoon? Here is a link proving this point. http://www.rezaee.ir/fa/pages/?cid=8521
French Police Clash with Iranian Ambassador
A video of the protesters confronting the Iranian Ambassador
“Shame on you”
Today like every year on January 31, the Islamic Republic’s Embassy in France held a banquet commemorating the day that Khomeini left France for Iran from Neuphle-le- Chateau. On the street, in front of the meeting place, Iranian protesters held signs and chanted slogans such as, “Death to the dictator,” and “Free the political prisoners.”
When the bus of the ambassador arrived the protesters increased their chanting. The French police had taken positions amongst the protesters to avoid any incidents. The A
mbassador, Mehdi Amir Abu Taleb, had acquired the Paris post in September of last year. Angered by the slogans, he attacked one of the protesters as though he were on Iranian soil where you can meet peaceful protesters with violence.
The police interfered and the angry Ambassador punched the police officer trying to restrain him in the chest. That act was enough to bring down the wrath of the police who beat his “Excellency” and were about to handcuff him when the personnel of the Embassy interceded and informed the police that it was the Ambassador that they were holding and that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
Report by: Atefeh Eghbal, eyewitness
Como cada año, la Embajada de la República Islámica en Francia organizó un banquete para conmemorar el día en que Khomeini salió de Neuphle-le-Chateau en Francia para Irán. Afuera del lugar de reunión, manifestantes iraníes se reunieron con pancartas y corearon lemas como “Muerte al dictador” y “Libertad para los presos políticos.”
Los manifestantes aumentaron su protesta cuando el autobús del Embajador Mehdi Amir Abu Taleb, quien asumió el puesto de París en Septiembre del año pasado, llegó. La policía francesa tomó posiciones entre los manifestantes para evitar cualquier incidente. El embajador, enojado por las consignas y pensando que estaba en Irán donde se puede atacar a manifestantes pacíficos con violencia, atacó a uno de los manifestantes.
La policía intervino y el embajador golpeó a un agente de la policía tratando de agarrarlo del pecho. Ese acto fue suficiente para que los policías golpearan a su “Excelencia” y estuvieron a punto de esposarlo cuando el personal de la Embajada intercedió e informó a la policía que era el embajador y gozaba de inmunidad diplomática.
On Saturday January 30, 2010, Afrooz Maghzi, the lawyer for Parisa Kakayi, visited branch 2 of the Revolution Court to meet with the prosecutor for her client’s file. Maghzi waited for a few hours, but the prosecutor did not show up.
In the past weeks, many lawyers have visited various branches of the security of investigation in the Revolution Court in Tehran. The lawyers are told that the branches that deal with Evin Prison cases have moved. Yet, when lawyers visit Evin Prison, they are told that the branches have not moved. Consequently, meetings with the prosecutors and clients have proven impossible. Many lawyers including Maghzi, Zohreh Arzani, and Mina Jafari have protested this ordeal.
Additionally, Kakayi was able to meet, for the second time, with her family for 20 minutes. Kakayi is a human rights, children’s, and women’s activist. On January 1, 2010, after being summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence, she was arrested and transferred to Evin Prison.
Recently, female political prisoner Shirin Alam Hooli was sentenced to death in Iran for allegedly being a member of the Kurdish opposition organization PJAK. Below is the translation of her letter from prison which was written on January 18, 2010. The letter describes the torture and interrogations she endured before her death sentence was issued.
Shirin Alam Hooli’s Letter:
I was arrested in April 2007 in Tehran by a number of uniformed and non-uniformed security forces. I was transferred directly to the Sepah Detention Centre and held there for 25 days. The minute I entered the detention centre they began beating me without asking me any questions or waiting for any answers.
I spent 22 days on a hunger strike. During that time, I endured both physical and psychological torture.
My interrogators were all men and I was tied to a bed. They would beat me with electrical batons, cables, and would punch and kick me until I was unconscious. At that time I still had difficulty speaking and understanding Farsi. When I was not able to answer their questions they continued to beat me until I lost consciousness.
When it was prayer time they would go pray. During that time, I was supposed to think so I can answer questions. Once they returned, they continued with their beatings until I lost consciousness. Then they would drench me with cold water.
When they saw that I would not break my hunger strike, they tried to force feed me with tubes. I resisted them by ripping the tubes out of my nose. This led to great pain and bleeding. Now, two years later, I still suffer from that pain.
One day during interrogations they kicked my stomach so hard that I had severe internal bleeding. Another time an interrogator (the only one I actually saw. I was always blindfolded in the presence of the other interrogators) began to ask me irrelevant questions. When I refused to answer him, he slapped me and pulled out a gun and put it to my head. He said, “Answer the questions. I know that you are a member of PJAK, you’re a terrorist. Listen to me girl, it doesn’t matter if you talk or not. Either way we are happy that we’ve captured a PJAK member.”
Once when a doctor had come to look at my wounds I was in a mixed state of sleep and consciousness. The doctor requested that I be transferred to the hospital. The interrogator asked, “Why does she have to go to the hospital? Can’t she be treated here?” The doctor replied, “It’s not for treatment. In the hospital, I can do something to her that she will start talking.”
The next day I was taken to the hospital with blind folds and handcuffs. The doctor gave me a needle. I lost complete control and apparently started talking and answering all of their questions exactly the way they wanted. They videotaped the scenario. Once I regained control of my mind, I asked them where I was and realized that I was still lying in the hospital bed. I was then transferred back to my cell.
Apparently even that wasn’t enough for the interrogators; they wanted me to suffer more. They would force me to stand up on my feet after they had beaten my feet so bad that they were completely swollen. Then they would give me ice. I could hear screams of other prisoners day and night, and that really bothered me and upset me. Later I learned that the screams had been taped in order to psychologically torture me. Sometimes I would sit in the interrogation room for hours while drops of cold water would fall on my head for hours.
On another occasion I was blindfolded and interrogated. The interrogator burned my hand with his cigarette. On another occasion the interrogator stood on my feet with his shoes for so long that my nails turned black and eventually fell off. Sometimes they would just force me to stand up the entire day in the interrogation room without asking me any questions while the interrogators solved crossword puzzles. They did everything they could to make sure I suffered.
After I was released from the hospital they decided to transfer me to Section 209 of Evin Prison, however due to my injuries, I was unable to walk to Section 209, so they refused to accept me. They held me in front of Section 209 for an entire day and then they were finally forced to take me to the prison clinic.
I had lost all sense of time and did not know whether it was day or night. I do not know how long I stayed in the prison’s clinic. Once I was feeling a little better, I was transferred to Section 209 and the interrogations began once again.
In Section 209 they had their own special interrogation techniques, and they always played “good cop/bad cop.”
First a “bad” interrogator would come and subject me to torture and tell me that he was not bound to any law, therefore he could do whatever he wanted with me. Then a “good” interrogator would come and ask the “bad” interrogator to stop torturing me and would offer me a cigarette. Then the entire cycle would repeat itself.
In Section 209, when I was not feeling well because of the torture or internal bleeding, they would just inject me with pain killers and I would spend entire days sleeping. They would not take me to the prison clinic for treatment.
Shirin Alam Hooli, Evin Prison, January 18, 2010
Economic index report for the second quarter of Iranian solar year 1388 (equivalent to 3rd quarter of 2009) was published yesterday.
By: Mohammad Sadegh Al-Hosseini
This quarterly report on the economic condition in the country contains some important points [to note]. Firstly, the report shows the country’s economic situation and direction in every quarter. Secondly, it moderates the expectations of the readers and economists with respect to real economic changes. That is why the report is considered a credible source for an economic evaluation and analysis. This report, like the World Bank’s report, does not portray a pleasant picture of the country’s economic state and activities.
The analysis presented in the latest edition of the report:
1) Economic growth: Finally, Iran’s rate of growth for 1387 ( Spring 2008-end of winter 2009) was officially announced. Based on the report, Iran’s Central Bank has announced the gross rate of growth in this period to be 3.2%. The growth rate is calculated by finding the sum of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of this year and the previous year, and dividing it by the GDP of the year in question. However, the data for Gross Domestic Product in 2008 is, unexpectedly, absent from the report. Instead, it reads “data is not available” in front of the GDP. If the growth rate is properly calculated, the GDP (the source of the calculations) should also be mentioned in the report, as it was in previous years. If the data for GDP is not available, then how was the rate of growth obtained? If the GDP is known, why is it absent from the report?
In previous years, the economic rate of growth announced by Iran’s Central Bank has not been significantly different from that reported by credible international institutions such as the World Bank. However, the rate of growth announced in this year’s report (i.e. 3.2%) is drastically different from the rate of 1% reported by the World Bank for Iran’s economy in 2009. Of course, minimal differences in these two rates is natural (given the difference between the Iranian and Western calendars- the Iranian solar calendar starts on March 21st, the first day of spring, instead of January 1st), but a difference of such a degree raises concerns when the GDP has not yet been announced.
2) Unfortunately, the statistics and data index for capital, industry (Index of Industrial Production), and stock exchange (Buyer’s Index) is also absent from the report. This report, like the number 56 edition (on 2009’s second quarter), lacks many of the 2008-2009 indicators. This finding has raised many questions among economist and has resulted in a refusal or inability to analyze Iran’s economy. It is unacceptable that an organization responsible for providing economic statistics (such as the Central Bank) is unable to do so because there is a lack of data. The officials have to be warned about the grave economic consequences of not presenting [complete] statistics.
3) In the housing sector, the trend of declining building permits continues. The number of permits issued in the second half of the year is 2,265 in Tehran and 29,449 in the rest of the country. The numbers show a decline of 64.9% and 37.5% in the first two months of the second half of the year. This indicator had shown a 62% decline for Tehran and a 36% decline in the entire country for the first quarter. As mentioned before, the decline in the number of permits issued can result in a shortage in the housing supply in the coming year. This can be very dangerous for the housing market given the age structure of the country (2012 is named the year of he demand or houses, because the amount of new marriages is expected to increase, thus increasing home sales).
4) In a rare occurrence, the data in the industrial sector shows that the number of permits issued for industrial units has declined for the second year in a row. The figures show a decline of 11.3% in 2007 and an unprecedented drop of 45.7% in 2008. This index, like the indicator for the number of building permits issued, is another forecasting indicator which unfortunately does not present an optimistic view of Iran’s future economy.
5) Production and export of oil in 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 has declined. Although the decline in this indicator is small, it can reflect an undesirable situation with respect to investment and development in oil fields.
The collection of the data presented above shows that Iran’s economic situation, based on the Central Bank’s statistics, is bleak. Furthermore, the rate of growth for the country was forecast to be 4.8% in 2008. The reported rate of growth of 3.2% shows that the bell has started to toll for the Iranian economy.
